Tuesday, October 19, 2010

Fulani Culture, with elements of caste Discrimination

 The Fulani, or Peulhs, are traditionally cow herders. Before the creation of Mali, the Fulani had a strict caste system within their own tribes with nobles owning and caring for the prized cows and slaves handling the menial work in the fields. Cows are of utmost importance to Fulani and the number of heads in a Fulani man's herd represents his wealth. Peulhs are easily recognizable by their slight frames, lighter skin tone, and hook noses. Women usually wear large, heavy gold earrings that rip wide holes in their earlobes. Tattoos above the lip and on the gums of women are considered fashionable.
A typical fulani man and woman

Social Groups Work Functions Titles

Social GroupsWork FunctionsTitles
Rimbhe-ArdiibheCan hold leadership in village, serve as Iman, etc.Fulbhe, Toorodbhe
Rimbhe-HuunbheFree born, noble in class but generally in service to a leader Sebhbhe, Jaawambhe, Subhalbhe
Neenbhe-Fecciram-GolleArtisans, ProductMaabubhe-Sanoobhe, Waylubhe, Sakkaebhe, Lawbhe
Neenbhe-Naagotoobhe-Naalankoobheperformers, historiansWammbhaabhe, Maabhubhe Suudu Paate
Jeyaabhe/JiyaabheCaptives of war laborersMaccubhe




The Traditional occupation within the Cast System in Futa Tooro

Tooroodo (sing), Toorodoe (Pl) leaders, Iman, Farmers
Cuballo (sing), Subalbhe (pl) The Subalbhe. Specialized in fishing and river matters.
Jaawando (sing), Jaawambhe (pl) Courtesans, diplomat intermediaries


Tooroodo (sing), Toorodoe (Pl)leaders, Iman, Farmers
Cuballo (sing), Subalbhe (pl) The Subalbhe. Specialized in fishing and river matters.
Jaawando (sing), Jaawambhe (pl) Courtesans, diplomat intermediaries
Ceddo (sing)leaders, courtesans, support position to leaders
Baylo (sing), Sebhbhe (pl)leaders, courtesans, support position to leaders
Mabe (sing) Maaabubhe (pl) Weavers and Pottery makers
Labbo (sing) Lawbhe (pl) Woodworkers
Sakke (sing) Sakkebhe (pl)Leathers Workers
Gawlo (sing) Awlubhe (pl)Singers, genealogist Griots
Bammbaado (sing) Wammbaabhe (pl)Griots, Guitarists
Maccudo (sing) Maccubhe (pl)Servants, entertainers



Explication of major social groups below

Wodaabe (see below) have their own form of Pulaaku called Mbodangaaku that unites them or 'holds their hands together'. A sense of responsibility to their fellow Wodaabe involving hospitality and generosity binds them together

Divisions of Fulbe

Fulbe Waalo and Fuuta Tooro. The waalo is the floodplain on the south bank of the Senegal River where crops can be grown as the floods recede each year during October - November. This is distinguished from the Jeeri or Ferlo, which is the slightly higher ground south of the Senegal River that stretches south to include the course of the Ferlo river. In its centre is the town of Lingeer (Linguere). On the Jeeri crops can grown only in the rainy season.
The Fulbe of the Futa Tooro live mostly in La Region du Fleuve of the Department of Podor, that is a region 250 km. long, south of the Senegal River between just south-west of Podor and Matam to the east. The Fuuta Tooro group of the Ururbe travel the furthest from near Njum to between Mbede and Haare Law.
The Fulbe have attempted to maintain both their pastoralism and also engage in cultivation, for keeping one's herd is security against poor harvests. They have tended to divide the family with the father cultivating the field and the children looking after the cattle. But neither can be done successfully, and many Fulbe farmers and sedentary herders are being forced to move into the Ferlo, the area of the Fulbe Jeeri, so that there is a degree of conflict between these two groups of Fulbe.

Fulbe Jeeri: in the centre of northern Senegal and a large number of diverse lineages still follow a semi-nomadic life, but this total possibly includes the Fulbe of the Waalo. They are named for the Jeeri or central region of dry higher ground south of the Senegal Valley, where most have lived since the 15th century. The Fulbe Jeeri can be divided between those groups who live in the areas of the old pre-colonial kingdoms nearer the coast, and those on the Jeeri further into the centre of Senegal. There are Fulbe Jeeri in Mali and probably others in the west of Gambia.
The Jeeri is a wind-swept, semi-arid area receiving sparse rainfall, crossed by the Valley of the Ferlo River and numerous dry valleys and river-beds which have pasture only during the rainy season. The town of Lingeer (Linguere) forms the centre around which the various groups of the Fulbe to be found. The Fulbe on the Jeeri are divided into two major groups called Laccenaabe, or Fulbe of the Lacce area and the Jeenglebe or Jengeloobe. The former has twelve clans. Some of these are related to those among the Waalwaalbe and with whom they have contact when they migrate northwards in the dry season. The Jeenglebe consists of three groups located south of the railway between Louga and Lingeer and southwards to the Saalum Valley.
The Fulbe Jeeri living on the Jeeri are family groups linked together by descent, who are still nomadic, or semi-nomadic as cattle raisers and with flocks of sheep and goats. During April the Fulbe Jeeri plant crops of millet, peanuts and beans on the Jeeri. In the following months during the rains they care for their animals and maintain their camps. After the harvest in October, when the rains are over, they move out of the Jeeri because in the dry season the watering holes dry up. They move either to the north towards the Waalo or south to the peanut basin, to return to the Jeeri in the following April.
This movement was modified in the 1950s when artisan wells were drilled at 30 km. intervals on the Jeeri. The constant supply of water is making it possible to cultivate fields where the ground was previously too dry. Sedentary Fulbe and Wolof farmers have been encouraged to settle on the Jeeri and graze their herds close to the wells, so that the wells near the Ferlo valley are becoming surrounded. The pastoralists are finding it increasingly difficult to move their herds close to the water. The water from the wells does not guarantee pasture close to the villages, as the pastoralists once found out to their cost. In the drought of 1972-73 many Jeerinkoobe decided to stay by the wells to have water, however they soon ran out of pasture and lost many animals.
Having learned this hard lesson, the Fulbe Jeeri have continued to be highly mobile, owning large herds of cattle and, more importantly, sheep and goats of which they have flocks of 500 to a 1,000 animals. Since the drought, the rainfall has been better, so that in most years, the majority of the Fulbe Jeeri are able to stay some 15 to 20 km. distant from the wells in the dry season and get better pasture than the farmers close to the wells. This has enabled them to adopt a semi-nomadic life style with semi-permanent camps for the families in reach of the boreholes, while the men travel with the herds looking for pasture. In this way the herds get the best of the pasture before the herds of the sedentary peoples, and they only need to go to the wells every second day. This means they move camp several times in the year to 'rotate' the herds over the pastures. But other Fulbe Jeeri continue to be truly nomadic with the whole families travelling outside the Jeeri in the dry season for pasture using straw huts, which that take apart to carry with them.
In the past the Fulbe Jeeri have found dry season pasture in forest reserves established by the French to the south, where agriculture was banned. There is no pastoral alternative to these reserves because the surrounding country is heavily populated and cultivated by Serer and Wolof peoples

West and south of the Jeeri region there is the area once occupied by the ancient kingdoms of Njambur, Kajoor, Bawol, Siin and Saalum. Here are other groups of Fulbe Jeeri. They are in the region of Njambur, Kajoor, Baol, Siin and Saalum in Senegal. These have had greater contact with the farming communities and so have more incentives to settle.


 The Fulbe in western Mali are located in Nioro and Kayes. Many of these originated from around Podor, in the Fouta Toro area of Senegal, but there are other villages of Fulbe that have a different origin. They spend the rainy season in some thirty villages in a 30 km. radius, mostly south-west of Nioro around Govmanwe. In the dry season they migrate some 200 km. south-westwards to the area north of Bafoulabe. Others are based around Segala and migrate southwards to the Senegal River Valley north-west of Bafoulabe.
migration of fulanis


Others are found 50 km. north-east of Kayes close to Kontela. They speak Pulaar.
Maasina (Macina) and Nampala Fulbe, Mali: These Fulbe are the central part of a number of interrelated areas of Fulbe, from Dilly and Nara through to northern Burkina Faso. They use, or have used in the past, the flooding of the Niger in its delta in central Mali as part of their migratory pastoralism. of the Fulbe in the Maasina region. The Fulbe live among many other peoples, including thousands of Bella, Moors, Tuareq, Bozo, Songhai and Dogon, and the estimate of their population may be affected by the fact that their social organisation, called the wuro, or a residential community, often includes more than the Fulbe.
Each wuro (Fr. Ouro) is under the leadership of an Ardo, jooro or dioro who negotiates the use of the pastures with his opposite numbers. The wuro may have several thousand heads of cattle, so reciprocal renting of pasture between the wuros is often necessary in the dry season, during May to July. At this time the Fulbe get permission at 'gates' such as near J'Afarabe and Yuwaru to move into the flood plain of the Niger River to use the fresh pasture until July.



 When the river floods in the months from August to December the Fulbe migrate north-westwards into the Sahel, to avoid the mud and flies during August to October, going as far as to the south of ema in Mauritania, a distance of over 300 km. In the 1990s many have turned to the south into farming areas, because of the threat of attack by the Kel Tamasheq. They return to the Niger flood plain in November, and so start the cycle again. Nomadic groups include the Cookinkoobe, Naasaadinkoobe and Sonnaabe migrate from the north. Others have abandoned going into the Delta, pasturing their cattle in localised areas.
The Fulbe live in semi-permanent villages, which also have one or two families of a craftsman caste,


probably Lawbe or Inadan, working in work, leather, and gold and silver and also ex-slaves called maccube, who nowadays have to be paid to do menial work, such as cultivation, sweeping and carrying.
Jallube herders (sing. Jallo) in the Douentza or Hayre region of Mali live in camps a few miles from villages of the Riimayde, the former slaves of the Fulbe, who are sedentary cultivators of millet. The Riimayde were either slaves of individual Jallube or of clans; but these arrangements were abolished in 1945. The Jallube themselves grow millet during the rainy season and trade milk with the Riimayde for millet, spices and other goods. The Jallube also cultivate as the Riimayde do it for them, and also herd the animals of some of the latter.
The Jullube migrate for the dry season, north towards the Delta or southwards. Some move the short distance to the fields of the Riimayde, the rest travel some 30 to 100 km. to the fields of Dogon farmers. They return before the rainy season in July to September to plant again. The men are responsible for both the herding and the cultivation of the millet. The women are responsible for the milking. According to pulaaku Jallube fathers neither eat with, or speak to their sons, even though the sons do all the cultivation and herding for them, Instructions have to be passed by intermediaries.
Burkina Faso has quite a few Fulani in the north-east. Jelgoobe, Djibo, northern Burkina Faso. The Jelgoobe claim to be descended from two chiefdoms who migrated from Haire region of Mali by 1750. According to their oral traditions, they arrived from Maasina in Mali, driving the cattle of the Jullube in the 17th century, because of famine and the political struggles of that region. But they did not escape these entirely, for they became in 1824 the eastern edge of the Islamic Diina kingdom of Aamadu Seeku, based in the Maasina, but rebelled and had their leaders killed. They appealed to the Mossi king of Yatenga, who attempted to impose Mossi rule. The Jelgoobe threw off both until the French arrived in 1864.
They continue a very independent group. Many Fulbe have migrated eastwards to Oudalan, Liptako, Yagha and into Niger who continue to call themselves Jelgoobe. These and other Fulbe of different origins and varied dates of arrival are called Fulbe Jelgooji, like the Fulbe Kelli, who became subject to the Jelgoobe. But some of the Riimaybe, ex-captives, who possibly gaining their freedom in the conflict with the Mossi around 1834, live in the town of Djibo and speak the language of the Mossi. The town is about 25% Mossi, a further 18% are also Riimaybe speaking Fulfulde.
In this region 72% of the population are of Fulfulde speaking and culture, but only 44% are Fulbe, the rest being Riimaybe former slaves, who now have independent farming communities. The Fulbe living in the surrounding hamlets speak Fulfulde and insist on keeping cattle to have status as cattle owners in the Fulbe tradition. Many migrated south during the droughts of the 1980s. But since then those that remained have prospered better than the farming population. This has been helped by new water holes and a cattle market in Djibo. They have a Inadan craft community, maabube - griots, living with them.
Queguedo Fulbe, to the west of Tenkodogo in south-east Burkina Faso, are an example of small groups of Fulani who are settling among other ethnic groups to have a specialised pastoral role. They came from Maasina in Mali and work as herders for the Mossi, as well as having cattle of their own. While both sides profit from the arrangement, they tend to mistrust each other, the Mossi claiming that the Fulani tend to 'lose' only Mossi cattle. The advantages to the Mossi include keeping their cattle separate from their crops. Another reason used to be, keeping the cattle hidden from the tax inspector! But this tax had been abolished. These Fulbe migrate with the cattle herds, going north out of the area during the growing season. The Fulbe also do some cultivation, but have portable houses that can be moved.
Niger has close to a million Fulbe, including the Bororo, right across the southern part of the country and west and north of Agadez. There has been a response of a few dozen.



In mali:

DOGON:
One of the most interesting ethnic groups of Mali is the Dogons. Legend says that the Dogon fled to the rocky hills of Mali's Bangiagara region to escape invading tribes. Living in the cliffs, Dogon devised brilliant methods to grow crops and transport water. They are well known for their agricultural skills and commitment to hard work. When not tending to their fields, the Dogons are handy woodworkers and carve intricate designs over blocks of wood used as doors - many of which are prized by leading museums.


Dogons

 Many Dogon have resisted converting to Islam like much of the rest of the country, and continue to believe in the animistic gods. Many religious ceremonies are held in absolute secrecy and any foreigner witnessing them is cursed to die. The Dogons have their own very complicated language. French and German missionaries over the years have succeeded in creating dictionaries of Dogon words, but the dialects are as numerous as the villages.

BOZO/BOBO:
 Bozos and Bobos are some of less prominent ethnic groups within Mali's borders. Bozo's are known for their fishing skills and tend to have their villages near the Niger and Bani rivers. Bozos do speak their own language, but knowledge of the language is nearly unknown by non-Bozos, so Bambara is frequently used.


Bozos

 Bobos are not held in the highest prestige by other ethnic groups and are frequently disregarded, and left to their own villages. Bobos do carve beautiful ritual masks, and are also renown for their love of dog meat. They fill the role of animal control for villages and Bobo men can be seen roaming the streets looking for villagers to hand over any spare strays.

TUAREG:
The men in blue of the desert are the infamous Tuareg. These legendary fighters -- known for their skill with the sword -- live mostly in the Northern reaches of Mali near Timbuktu and Kidal. Tuaregs originally controlled the caravan routes that brought salt to the south from the desert salt mines, but air transport has made the business less profitable in recent years. Tuareg's are very proud people with an ancient written language and traditions of poetry. Their nomadic roots have made it difficult for them to accept Malian borders, and they fiercely resisted statehood of their desert home.


TUAREG FIGHTERS

Only recently have the Tuaregs and the Malian government reached an agreement, and now many Tuaregs are employed in government services. Traditional Tuareg men are 'veiled' to mark their transition from adolescence. The thick helmet of cloth around their heads is never removed in the presence of anyone, and is worn even while sleeping and eating. The indigo with which they dye their robes rubs off of their skin, giving them the title 'blue men of the desert'. The sword is a Tuareg's most valued possession. Many are passed from generation to generation and said to be protected by the victories of its past owners.

i have succeded in combining these cultural differences to write a TV drama GURU GUANO. contact me on +2348038843041.

Osu Caste system in Nigeria (Igbo community)

THE Igbos are found mostly in the South Eastern and South Central Nigeria called
igboland or Igbo society (Alaigbo or Anaigbo). By the late 20th Century the Osu caste system is an obnoxious practice among the Igbo in south east Nigeria which has refused to go away despite the impact of Christianity, education and civilization, and the human rights culture. The population of the Igbos was about 27 million. The majority of the Igbos are Christians, but some of them practice the indigenous traditional religion, whose major tenets are shared by all
Igbo speaking people of Nigeria

Igbo people

However, a relic of the indigenous religious practice of the Igbos is the dehumanizing Osu caste system, which has divided and alienated the Igbos.
I want to discuss Osu caste system, an indigenous religious belief
system, practiced within the Igbo nation, with the purpose of bringing the discriminatory, dehumanizing and obnoxious caste system to the attention of the international community. This is because whenever issues of discriminatory practices around the world are tabled for discussion in the international community, the repugnant and discriminatory Osu caste system is never mentioned.
The Osu, by definition, is a people sacrificed to the gods in Igbo community. And they assist the high priest of the traditional religion to serve the deities or the gods in their shrine. It is the belief of many Igbo traditionalists that the deities, which were (and are still) perceived in some quarters as being very powerful, would wreck havoc in the society, if they are not appeased.

A typical igbo shrine

In some special circumstances, those who hold the traditional beliefs of the Igbos could
transform a Diala who committed certain atrocities against the land into an Osu. This process involved intricate rituals (offering of libations and sacrificing animals to the earth goddess). Some of the ancestors of the present-day Osu people inherited their dehumanizing social status this way. That method is now a thing of the old; Western influence has affected this practice. Presently, one could acquire the Osu status through inheritance and marriage.
Osu caste system is a societal institution borne out of a primitive traditional belief system colored by superstition and propagated by ignorance. It is absurd
to categorize a human as a sub-human being. the Osu caste system, which is a form of discrimination, has caused inter-communal discords and wars between the Osu and the Diala in Igboland. And many lives and properties have been destroyed as a result.
According to the United Nations definition, discrimination includes any conduct based on
a distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation
either to individual capacities or merits, or to the concrete behavior of the individual
person.
The discriminatory Osu practices involves inequality in freedom of movement and choice of residence, inequality in the right of peaceful association, inequality in the enjoyment of the right to marry and establish a family, (and) inequality in access to public office. That is the crux of the matter with the Osu caste system in Igboland. If one may ask, could a right exist if it is not regularly enforced? To put it differently, can a right exist without a
specific legislation that provides for its protection and remedies if violated? Oddly
enough, the victims of the Osu system do not have any legal recourse in
Igboland. And strangely, some people believe that the humiliating Osu caste system is a part of the Igbo culture nobody should temper with. Fortunately, many Igbos have a contrary opinion.for me, i say enough is enough!
The Osu caste system and the indigenous religious practices of the Igbo nation. All
human beings are created equal, but human experiences are heterogeneous. Some people
have had it rough all their lives on earth, while others do not have a lot to complain about.
Naturally, life has the same meaning for everyone, but the Osu caste system in Igboland seems to have changed the meaning of life for a group of people branded Osu. No historical question gives the Igbos more concern than that of, “How did the Osu caste system come to be in Igboland?”
There is a paucity of written information on the issue of the Osu caste system. This is apparently because many people shy away from discussing the issue for fear of being branded Osu lovers.
An individual’s fortunes are determined by the by-product of interactions that exist between one’s “chi”, the deities and the Creator or “Chineke”.
Humans interact directly with deities, which function as intermediaries to the Supreme Spirit or Creator. Being in good terms with powerful deities in one’s domain is an assurance that one is likely to obtain the largesse of creation while, at same time,minimize the wrath of the forces of nature. It is an individual’s obligation to observe the customs of the land since their violation could offend the deities; and goodwill and protection from the deities depends on one’s cordial relationship with them.


Many people have condemned the system which has traumatized many innocent people but the problem persists. one fact is that the Osu system of discrimination is an outdated tradition with no basis for its continued practice and observance in the contemporary Igbo society.
Traditionally, there are two classes of people in Igboland – the Nwadiala and the Osu.
The Nwadiala literally meaning ‘sons of the soil’. They are the masters while the Osu are the people dedicated to the gods; so they are regarded as slaves, strangers, outcasts and untouchables. Chinua Achebe in his book, No longer At Ease, aptly describes Osu thus: “Our fathers in their darkness and ignorance called an innocent man Osu, a thing given to the idols, and thereafter he became an . outcast, and his children, and his children’s children forever”.
The Osus are treated as inferior human beings and kept in a state of permanent and irreversible disability; they are subjected to various forms of abuse and discrimination. The Osu are made to live separately from the freeborn; they reside very close to shrines and market places.
The Osu are not allowed to dance, drink, hold hands, associate or have sexual relationship with the Nwadiala. They are not even allowed to break kola nut at meetings or pour libation or pray to God on behalf of a freeborn at any community gathering.
It is believed that such prayers will bring calamity and misfortune.

Saturday, October 9, 2010

Inter Religous Sucess in Nigeria

This part of Africa where I come from, the rate of poverty is not as average as it is shown in the television news or as it is written on papers. It is deeply rooted in remote villages, creating in them, a hopeless lifestyle.



“Being unwanted, unloved, uncared for, forgotten by everybody, I think that is a much greater hunger, a much greater poverty than the person who has nothing to eat”


( Quote Mother Teresa)


All through my childhood, I have acknowledged the fact that I was not from a poor home though my father was just a primary school teacher who had our faith deeply rooted in the Anglican doctrine.


1996, when I finished my Junior West African Examination, I had a long period to stay before my result will come, so my father took me to Okutu where he lived.


group of okutu volunteers



Okutu under Nsukka Local Government Area of Enugu State were dominated by Christian Igbos but they shared a common boundary with Ugwaka –Ola under Igalamela Local Government of Kogi State which was dominated by Muslims. The major problem of these communities was that they were abandoned by their host states due to the remoteness of their locations. They lived in grass houses which always flames at winter periods of every year. They leaved in abject poverty and what they needed was not business ideas or micro financing but Education.


When I got to Okutu on August 21, 1996, I began to realize the challenges my father was facing as a teacher and an Anglican Priest. He trained his students not only educationally but socially and religiously. The two communities relieved their children on him and any child stubborn to the parents would be sent to my father’s house for moral discipline. Within the month of my stay, he took me around to see how he ran his missionary/charity work.
                               

Saturday, October 2, 2010

Fifty Years of War in Nigeria

Following World War II, in absolute response to the advancement of Nigeria nationalism and demands for independence, constitutions legislated by the British Government moved Nigeria towards self-government on a representative and increasingly federal basis. On October 1, 1960, Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom. Emerging as a federal Republic, on our 50th independence anniversary, analyzing our failures and achievements, this piece will look at Nigeria, a nation at 50, ‘the past, the Future’

Federal republic of Nigeria is a constitutional republic comprising thirty –six states and its federal capital territory, Abuja. Located in West Africa and shares land borders with Cameroon in the east, Niger in the north, republic of Benin and Chad in the west. The three most influential ethnic groups in Nigeria are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. In terms of religion Nigeria is split half and half between Muslims and Christians with a very small minority who practice traditional religion. Occupying a total area of 923,768km2 (356,669 sq mi) makes it the 32nd largest country in the world. The main rivers are the Niger and the Benue River which converge and empty into the Niger delta. Interestingly, the name Nigeria was taken from the Niger River running through the country, as coined by Flora Shaw, the future wife of Baron Lugard, a British colonial administrator, in the late 19th century.

Nigeria is classified as a mixed economy emerging market, and has already reached middle income status according to the world bank, with its abundant supply of natural resources, well-developed financial, legal, communications, transport sectors and stock exchange. Nigeria is the United States’ largest trading partner in Saharan Africa and supplies a fifth of its oil, currently the 50th-largest export for U.S. goods and the 14th-largest exporter of goods to the U.S. the United States is the country’s largest foreign investor. Over the years, economic development had been hindered by years of military rule, corruption, and mismanagement, the restoration of democracy and subsequent economic reforms have successfully put Nigeria back on track towards achieving its full economic potential. It is now one of the largest economies in Africa, and the largest economy in West African Region.

According to the United Nations, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa, estimated in 2009 to have 154,729,000, distributed as 51.7% rural and 48.3% urban, and with a population density of 167.5 people per square kilometer. Currently undergoing explosive population growth as it is one of the eight countries expected to account collectively for half of the world’s total population increase from 2005-2050. 42.3% of the population is between 0-14 years of age, while 56.6% is between 15-65, the birth rate is 40.4 while death rate is16.9 per 1000 people.

Healthcare and general living conditions in Nigeria has been poor. Life expectancy is 47 years (average male/female) and just over half of the population has access to potable water and appropriate sanitation; the percentage of children under five went up between 1990 and 2003 and infant mortality is 97.1 per 1000 live births. HIV/AIDS rate in Nigeria in 2003 was5.6% among youths of 20-29.there has been Polio crises as well as periodic outbreak of malaria, sleeping sickness and cholera which is presently experienced in the northern part of Nigeria. There has been a vaccination drive, spread headed by W.H.O, to combat polio and malaria that has also been met with controversy in some regions.

Education is also in a state of neglect. After the 1970s oil boom, tertiary education was improved so that it would reach every sub region of Nigeria. Educational system has been described as “dysfunctional” largely because of decaying institutional infrastructure. 68% of the population is literate and the rate for men (75.7%) is higher than that for women (60.6%).

Nigeria has more than 250 ethnic groups with varying languages and customs, creating a country with rich ethnic diversity. Because of its multitude of diverse ethno-linguistic groups, Nigeria prior to independence has been faced with sectarian tensions and violence. Taking us down to the early years of independence, this essay shall dig up all the causes of Nigeria’s failures and victories.

Newly independent, Nigeria’s government was a coalition of consecutive parties: the Nigeria People’s Congress (NPC), a party dominated by northern and those with Islamic faith, and the Igbo and Christian dominated National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) led by Nnamdi Azikiwe, who became Nigeria’s maiden Governor-General in 1960. Forming the opposition was the comparatively liberal Action Group (AG), which was largely dominated by the Yoruba and led by Obafemi Awolowo. The cultural and political differences between Nigeria’s dominant ethnicities, the Hausa (Northerners) Igbo (Easterners) and Yoruba (Westerners) were sharp. As it were, the Federal Republic of Nigeria gone from these three regions in 1954 to thirty-six states and a Federal territory since 1996. The country is in effect, under six geopolitical zones. While these zones are official or constitutional units of Nigeria’s federalism, they constitute for many purposes the organizing principle of country’s national politics. The six zones include the north-west (seven states), the north-east (six states), the north –central (six states plus Abuja, the federal capital territory), the south-east (five states), and the south west (six states). Among their consecutive states, their zones are defined to reflect political interests as well as ethnic, religious and historical harmony. But despite the political engineering, no zone including the most ethnical and religiously homogenous, has escaped the wrath of communal violence. Today, the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria reflect similar emotive dispositions that destroyed the now defunct region structures. Each harbor its own particular communal distresses that frequently give rise to the destruction of lives and property, a morbid actualization of the federal character doctrine. How ever, the causes of conflict in Nigeria could be traced back to 1966 when there was a back-back military coup. The first was in January and led by a collection of young leftists under Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. It was partially successful; the coup plotters murdered the Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the premier of the northern Region, Sir Ahmedu Bello, the premier of the western region, Sir Ladoke Akintola. Despite this, the coupists could not set up a central government because of logistic reasons. Sir Nwafor Orizu, the acting president was then pressured to hand over government to the Nigeria Army, under the Command of General JTU Aguiyi-Ironsi. The coup was conceived out of the disequilibrium and perceived corruption of the electoral and political process. It was however counter-acted by another successful plot, supported primarily by northern military officers and northerners who favored the NPC; it was engineered by northern officers, which allowed Lt Colonel Yakubu Gowon to become head of state. This sequence of events led to increase in ethnic tension and violence. The northern coup, which was mostly motivated by ethnic and religious reasons, was bloodbath of both military officers and civilians, especially those of Igbo extraction. This cruel violence against the Igbo increased their desire for autonomy and protection from the military’s wrath. By May 1967, the Eastern region had declared itself an independent state called the Republic of Biafra under the leadership of Lt Colonel Emeka Ojukwu in line with the wishes of the people. The Nigeria Civil War began as the Nigerian (Western and Northern) side attacked Biafra (South-eastern) on July 6, 1967 at Garkem signaling the beginning of the 30 month war that ended in January 1970. More than one million people died in the three-year civil war. These killings created a lasting wound in the heart of the bereaved and revenge rested at the hearts of the citizens. That was not only the active events in Nigeria after independence. During the oil boom of the 1970, Nigeria joined OPEC and billions of dollars generated by production in the oil-rich Niger Delta flowed into the coffers of the Nigeria state. However, increasing corruption and graft at all levels of government squandered most of the earnings. The northern military clique benefited immensely from the oil boom to the detriment of the Nigerian people and economy. As oil revenues fuelled the rise of federal subventions to states and precariously to individuals, the federal government soon became the center of political struggle and the center became the threshold of power in the country. As oil production and revenue rose, the Nigerian government created a dangerous situation as it became increasingly dependent on oil revenue and the international commodity markets for budgetary and economic concerns eschewing economic stability. That spelled doom to the federalism in Nigeria.

Beginning in 1979, Nigerians participated in a brief return to democracy when Olusegun Obasanjo transferred power to the civilian regime of Shehu Shagari. The shehu Shagari government was viewed as corrupt and incompetent by virtually all sector of Nigerian society, so when the regime was overthrown by the military coup of Mohammed Buhari shortly after the regime’s fraudulent re-election in 1984, it was generally viewed as a positive development by most of the population. Buhari promised major reforms but his government fared little better than its predecessor, and his regime was overthrown by yet another military coup in 1985.Babangida Ibrahim, promptly declared himself president and commander in chief of armed forces and the ruling supreme military council and also set 1990 as official deadline for a return to democratic Governance. Babangida’s tenure was marked by a flurry of political activity; he instituted the international Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to aid in the repayment of the country’s crushing international debt, which most federal revenue was dedicated to servicing. He also inflamed religious tensions in the nation and particularly the south by enrolling Nigeria in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. After Babangida survived an abortive coup, he pushed back the promised return to democracy to 1992. When free and fair elections were finally held on the 12th of June 1993, Babangida declared that the results showing a presidential victory for Moshood Kashimawo Oluwale Abiola null and void, sparking mass civilian violence in protest which effectively shut down .the Babangida’s regime is adjudged to be at apogee of corruption in the history of the nation as it was during his time that corruption became officially diluted in Nigeria. Babangida’s caretaker regime headed by Ernest Shonekan survived only until late 1993 when General Sani Abacha took power in another military coup. Abacha proved perhaps Nigeria’s most brutal ruler and employed violence on wide scale to suppress the continuing pandemic of civilian unrest. Money has been found in various western European countries banks traced to him. He avoided coup plots by bribing army generals. Several hundred millions dollars in accounts traced to him were unearthed in 1999. The regime came to an end when the director was found dead amid dubious circumstances. Abacha’s death yielded an opportunity for return to civilian rule. Nigeria re-achieved democracy in 1999 when it elected Olusegun Obasanjo as the new president ending almost thirty three-years of military rule. (From 1966 until 1999) excluding the short-lived second republic (1979 and 1983) by military dictators who seized power in coups d’état and counter-coups during the Nigeria military juntas of 1966-1979 and 1983-1998. Although the elections that brought Obasanjo to power in 1999 and again in 2003 were condemned as unfair, Nigeria marked improvements in attempts to tackle government corruption and to hasten development. While Obasanjo showed willingness to fight corruption, he was accused by many. After Obasanjo unwillingly completed his tenure, Umaru Musa Yaradua of the people’s Democratic Party, came into power in the general election of 2007- an election that was witnessed and condemned by international community as being massively flawed. Yar’adua died on the 5th of May 2010. Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as Yar’adua’s replacement on 6 may 2010 becoming Nigeria’s 14th head of state. On the 18 may, 2011, the national Assembly approved President Goodluck Jonathan’s nomination of former Kaduna state governor Namadi Sambo, an architect, for the position of Vice president of the federal Republic of Nigeria. They will serve in their respective positions until the next election which is scheduled for January 2011 by the present INEC Chairman Prof. Attahiru Jega.

Does Nigeria have a viable future? In contemporary Nigeria, the quality of thought and intellectual practice, which under-grid the social and public policy domains are abysmally low. While academic pursuits provide the raw material for intellectual Endeavour, the pursuit and development of an intellectual culture presumes an inherent love, reverence and conscious cultivation of a tradition of learning and scholarship. The lack of an intellectual base and our lack of appreciation for same are demonstrated by the fact that currently, Nigeria has no institution for advanced studies of any kind. A society like Nigeria should initiate a stable funding to create an environment to nurture creative and original thinkers, otherwise, they will not be able to produce an enduring constitutional or legal framework for the conduct of its business, including its governance .In any viable socio-political and economic system, which is what a nation-state is when tripped of the accretions of emotionalism, posturing and myths on which patriotism is anchored, the vision, philosophy and ideology that gives validity, credibility and legitimacy to the national personality is embodied within a constitutional framework, the ideas, which give life to the citizenry, depend on the depth of the intellectual anchor and relevant underpinnings of the national vision. Since ideas are the defining signature of culture and determine its historical relevance, genealogy and life span. These factors shape evolution and civilization.

It is a task, which demands a committed and engaged leadership class. We had earlier observed that Nigeria’s status in the power equation of the new world order revolves around the size and dynamism of its economy. Given the reality on the ground, we should be under no illusions that anyone regards us as the giant of Africa. It is a myth that lulls us into a false sense of importance and achievement. Given our resources, it is also a circumstance that portrays us as an incompetent, uncaring and visionless society for, in the modern world, no elite faced with these dire statistics can sleep easy. And the reasons are obvious, religious killings, food riots, and violent protests over living conditions, especially housing, disillusionment and loss of hope in a viable future in the youth- all these have brought down many a government in the history of the contemporary Nigeria. It is a truism that the best guarantor of social stability and social harmony is prosperous and growing economy. In the modern world, it is economics that drives the politics but here in Nigeria, who knows what is driving us, do you?